The evolving governance of science and technology: implications for stakeholder relations with the OPCW and the National Authorities by McLeish, Caitriona
  
 
26 October 2012 
 
Jean Pascal ZANDERS 




WORKSHOP ON THE 
FUTURE OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 
TRANSITIONING TOWARDS THE POST-DESTRUCTION PHASE 
 




The workshop, organised by the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) in cooperation with the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), was held in Brussels on 10 September 2012. Its purpose 
was to have an in-depth brainstorming session on the future of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC) with officials from EU Member States and candidate countries. 
 
Representatives participated from Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, as well as the EEAS and the EUISS. 
 
Invited non-governmental expert speakers were nationals from Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
 
II. Meeting presentations 
Dr Jean Pascal Zanders welcomed the participants on behalf of the EUISS and briefly outlined the 
purpose of the workshop. Ms Clara Ganslandt, Head of Division, Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
Conventional Weapons, Space, EEAS, recalled the success of the CWC at the 15
th
 anniversary of its 
entry into force. At the same time, she referred to important remaining challenges, including the 
delays in the destruction of US and Russian chemical weapons (CW), the continued need for 
universalisation and national implementation, and the threats posed by holdout states such as Syria 
and non-state actors. She confirmed the EU’s continuing commitment to the CWC, including 
through the multiple Joint Actions. 
 
In the opening presentation Dr Jean Pascal Zanders (Senior Research Fellow, EUISS) noted that 
while the CWC may be of unlimited duration, this does not mean that it will be perpetual. One of 
the tasks for the States Parties is to retain the convention’s relevancy after the termination of CW 
destruction operations. Success is presently defined by political statements and illustrated by means 
of statistics (e.g., numbers of States Parties, munitions destroyed, inspections, etc.). However, some 
of those numbers will eventually become meaningless, simply because the ultimate goals have been 
achieved. This raises the question what the future definition of success will be and by what 




In the context of challenges to the CWC it may appear remarkable that ‘failure’ has never been 
defined. Several developments have been viewed as setbacks (e.g., destruction deadlines, status of 
national implementation, universalisation, Article XI implementation, etc.), but the firm belief 
exists that these goals must and can be achieved given time and sufficient resources. Yet, there is no 
envisagement of an event or series of events that might irreparably harm the CWC. While certain 
damaging scenarios can be ideated, precisely because they can be imagined, they are also 
preventable. Far greater risk to the CWC may result from developments that fall between the folds 
of the foreseeable. For instance, many trend analyses are linear and allow for certain unexpected 
developments, but which tools should be developed to be able to identify and assess the impact of 
the confluence of otherwise independent developments (as, for example, the meeting of science, 
industry and military doctrine in the first major chemical attack in Belgium in 1915)? Enabling 
technologies often allow unforeseen directions in research and development. Another major risk to 
the future of the convention is ‘failure by routine’. If the verification machinery remains welded to 
the three schedules, then the CWC’s capacity to prevent future armament may become limited to 
past warfare agents only. Similarly, dangers of systemic confirmation bias must be addressed so 
that expectations of compliance do not blind inspectors and verification analysts to the small 
statistical anomaly or subtle hint that something insidious might be going on. 
 
Many political, social and technological developments take place outside of the CWC, but 
nonetheless have a major impact on the present and future functioning of the convention. They 
include the emergence of new stakeholders and security actors; the growing role of non-state and 
transnational actors and the resulting relative diminishing influence of government agencies over 
these processes; and the shifting balances of power in the economic, political and military spheres 
and rise of multiple power centres. These factors all contribute to the future challenge of 
governance of chemistry and its many applications in a post-proliferation world. Once destruction 
activities have been completed, international trade of toxic chemicals and other technology 
transfers, for instance, will assume greater relevancy in the future prevention of CW. How these 
will be monitored may require careful recalibration of verification resources, or they may entail 
greater responsibilities for the National Authorities if States Parties decide that the Technical 
Secretariat must downsize. The future governance regime of the CWC should ideally also 
incorporate several civil society constituencies and tap into their capacity for independent 
intellectual input into many areas of concern to the OPCW. However, two less frequently discussed 
dimensions also require consideration, namely the development of beneficial working relationships 
between National Authorities and domestic stakeholders and universalisation of civil society’s 
contribution to the widening and deepening of the CWC regime. 
 
H.E. Mary Whelan (Permanent Representative of Ireland to the OPCW and Vice-Chair of the Open-
ended Working Group for preparation of the Third Review Conference) briefed participants on the 
preparations for the forthcoming review conference. She suggested that the overall objective for the 
period to 2023 should be to achieve a world free of CW, universality of the Convention, a robust 
verification mechanism, a strong cooperative relationship with industry, and a treaty regime that is 
both flexible enough to respond to a changing scientific environment and authoritative enough to 
command universal respect and support. In this context States Parties could use the Third Review 
Conference to recommit to achieving the goals of the CWC, critically evaluate their collective and 
national implementation efforts and consider whether any reorientation of the work of the OPCW is 
required. Ambassador Whelan also referred to the potential of political developments (e.g., in the 




She noted that the issue of national implementation was moving increasingly to the fore in the 
preparatory process, which is not surprising given the situation whereby less than half of States 
Parties have comprehensive legislation in place. Maintaining the capacity of the Technical 
Secretariat to fulfil its tasks and maintain the right mix of expertise was also of great importance. 
 
Finally, Ambassador Whelan noted that the EU could engage more actively with the OPCW. 
 
Dr Ralf Trapp (Independent Disarmament Consultant) outlined a number of trends in chemical 
research, development and production that pose challenges to the future operation of the CWC 
verification system. In the research area, he noted the accelerating convergence and integration 
between chemistry and biology and ancillary fields. New communication technologies enable novel 
ways of collaboration between institutes and researchers. The mass of available data and limits on 
computing power may presently be the single most important impediments to even further 
progression. With regard to development, the time from invention to marketing keeps on shrinking. 
New technologies and processes also depress cost markedly. At the same time automation of 
processes allows their introduction into work environments that only a few years ago would have 
required advanced scientific and technical expertise and skills (‘de-skilling’). Notwithstanding, 
upscaling from development to industrial production remains a major challenge. New techniques 
also enable the synthesis of difficult molecules that would challenge more traditional methods. 
 
These trends affect the perception of the threat posed by CW. The principle concern today is less 
the large military stockpile, but rather the potential capabilities of dual-use technologies, break-out 
capacities, and the attribution of intent to observed activities. It raises questions about the thresholds 
of risk to the CWC as kilograms rather than tens of tonnes of agent might represent a significant 
quantity (e.g., terrorism vs. a state). With some new products emerging from the interaction 
between biology and chemistry, the figure for what constitutes a relevant amount may drop even 
further over the next decade or so.  
 
With regard to the future of the CWC, these developments raise questions about the organisation of 
verification, particularly concerning Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPF). To be able to 
determine compliance in the absence of CW programmes, a new verification baseline with its 
evaluation criteria is required. In particular, it will be necessary to spell out the concrete objectives 
of the verification process and establish the number and types of inspections needed to create 
confidence. If maintained, current trends in the OPCW (dwindling relevancy of the schedules in the 
light of the aforementioned scientific and technological developments, inadequate tools, the 
reduction of the numbers of inspectors and the potential loss of relevant expertise) might therefore 
pose a risk to the future of the CWC. 
 
Dr Caítriona McLeish (Senior Fellow, Harvard Sussex Program, Sussex University) stated that the 
question of science and technology development is rooted in the general purpose criterion, which 
ensures that the prohibitions in the CWC are both comprehensive and timeless. On a more practical 
level, science and technology advancements are the subject of review conferences and the Scientific 
Advisory Board enables the Director General to render scientific advice to the OPCW’s various 
decision-making organs. National authorities are also confronted with the question of science and 
technology as a consequence of their specific responsibilities in the CWC verification process and 
resulting interaction with producers and users of science and technology. 
 
Science, however, does not evolve in a vacuum. The socio-political environment will continue to be 
characterised by further increases in societal and economic interconnectedness within and across 
modern societies. Such external changes place pressure on the CWC, meaning that different and 
new approaches to the governance of science and technology will become necessary. In particular, 
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the top-down ‘government’ approach will have be supplemented by a more horizontal ‘governance’ 
system based on the acknowledgement, principally by governments, that for some issues no single 
body can achieve success on its own because no single actor, public or private, owns all of the 
knowledge and information required or capabilities to solve the problem. The transition will alter 
the relationship between the Technical Secretariat and National Authorities, on the one hand, and 
producers and users of science and technology, on the other hand. In particular, the latter group will 
become stakeholders whose particular expertise and resources may contribute to the CWC 
objectives. Such partnership is already emerging, but not yet fully embraced. The convention is 
sufficiently equipped to allow a transition towards a governance model, but the States Parties will 




 Review Conference could already undertake a number of steps to promote the governance 
model. At a basic level, the understanding of the impact of scientific and technological change 
should become a top priority. The Technical Secretariat should develop and expand its relationships 
with regulatory bodies in the domain and enhance its interactions with relevant stakeholders. 
Several initiatives to encourage stakeholder participation in major events, such as review 
conferences, should be considered. The role of the Scientific Advisory Board, the status of its 
reports and the ways in which it can interact with the science and technology community should be 
reviewed with a view to enhance its contribution to the CWC goals.  
 
In a more general sense, the OPCW should maximise its interaction with the broader shareholder 
community (including civil society representatives), among other things, by offering concrete or 
virtual platform for communication, information dissemination and encouraging relevant research 
into all aspects of CWC governance and implementation. 
 
Mr Richard Guthrie (CBW Events and Postgraduate researcher, University of Bath) argued that 
while the present focus of States Parties remains on CW destruction, the CWC contains many more 
obligations that need to be correlated to a variety of on-going threats. This poses questions about the 
accuracy of threat assessments, and therefore the level and type of response capacity required under 
the CWC. He noted that the nature of threats may change much faster than the institutional capacity 
to respond to them. 
 
With regard to the organisation of verification, he noted the growing tension between the so-called 
‘hierarchy of risk’ based on the three schedules and the geographical distribution of risk. Does a 
country committed to the CWC goals with a schedule 2 facility pose a greater risk than one of 
concern with an OCPF? 
 
The role of the National Authority was defined during the negotiation of the CWC. It can be viewed 
as a mere contact point or as an active agency. Its role in relation to the Technical Secretariat 
depends in essence on its effectiveness. In the light of future technological developments, the 
importance of the National Authority will only increase, with, inter alia, the need to develop 
relationships with national stakeholders to prevent misuse of dual-use technologies. A key question 
requiring an answer in the near future concerns the routine and non-routine activities the Technical 
Secretariat will have to undertake to inhibit misuse. However, if States Parties are unwilling to fund 
those tasks, will they be prepared to undertake and pay for them on a national level? 
 
The OPCW will have to give careful consideration to the relationship between the tasks and 
responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat and the National Authorities and how that relationship 
might evolve. First and foremost, the responsibility to prevent future chemical armament must 
receive sufficient priority on the global level based on realistic threat assessments. To this end, the 
Technical Secretariat must be accorded sufficient resources to maintain its skills base and undertake 
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the necessary tasks. In addition, irrespective of how the future division of responsibilities between 
the Technical Secretariat and the National Authorities might evolve, the National Authorities must 
be strengthened in order for them to participate fully in the verification process. 
 
Ms Yasemin Balci (Associate Legal Officer, VERTIC) looked at the changes facing the CWC and 
their implications for national implementation measures. Presently, only 88 out of 188 States Parties 
have implementation legislation in key areas and 186 have designated a National Authority, 
although in a number of cases these are merely an address for OPCW correspondence. As the 
OPCW’s focus will shift from destruction to the prevention of the re-emergence of CW, the status 
of national implementation is perilously low. Diminishing resources for legislative support may 
have important consequences. The implementation obligations in Article VII will not change in the 
post-destruction era, but the manner in States Parties will have to oversee and enforce the measures 
in the light of scientific and technological advances will be different. 
  
Looking at some changes foreseen by the Advisory Panel on the Future Priorities of the OPCW, Ms 
Balci considered effects on national implementation requirements in three areas. The CWC’s scope 
is sufficiently wide and comprehensive to cover international security developments (including 
inter- and intra-state armed conflict) and the transposition of international obligations into the 
domestic legal system covers this issue area. The Rome Statute, which created the International 
Criminal Court and makes individuals criminally accountable for war crimes (which include the use 
of CW in international or internal wars), reinforces this need to transpose the CWC’s general 
prohibitions into domestic law. However, more national measures may be required to address 
threats posed by non-state actors, both in terms of CW acquisition or sabotage of chemical facilities. 
The OPCW is still very cautious about linking the CWC with counter-terrorism objectives. States 
Parties also remain reluctant to discuss the place of incapacitating chemical agents in international 
law, and hence in national implementation. In a legal case concerning the use of an incapacitating 
agent to liberate hostages in the 2002 Moscow theatre siege, the European Court of Human Rights 
did not refer to the CWC as a relevant source of international law. 
 
The convergence of chemistry and biology calls for answers relating to the relationship between the 
CWC and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). VERTIC data indicate that 
States Parties work concurrently on their chemical and biological weapons legislation. However, to 
be able to regulate science and technology in the future, States Parties will need to agree on 
international measures, before they can start implementing them on the national level. It is expected 
that advances in science and technology will increase the challenges for National Authorities to 
monitor transfers and facilities as well as to generally enforce legislation. Budget reductions for 
National Authorities are likely to severely hamper their effectiveness. 
 
In view of the migration of chemical production capacity to Asia and Latin America, the need for 
implementation legislation and a legal framework to regulate the industry there is great. 
 
In the final session Dr Cindy Vestergaard (International Relations & European Studies, Danish 
Institute for International Studies) discussed a number of potential developments during the period 
leading up to the 2013 Review Conference that might hamper the overall EU goals in the field of 
disarmament and non-proliferation based on the 2003 WMD strategy. In particular, she referred to 
the current economic and financial crisis and its possible impact on the OPCW budget, and hence 
on opportunities for developing future strategies. While the EU continues to fund the CWC through 
Joint Actions, it also accepts cuts to the OPCW budget in spite of the fact that the WMD strategy 
views support for multilateral institutions as a first line of defence. She recalled the experience with 
the EU Common Position for the 2011 BTWC Review Conference. Dr Vestergaard stressed the 




Among the other issues that might affect the outcome of the Review Conference, she listed the 
current political and social upheaval in the Middle East, the civil war in Syria and the continuing 
risk of accidental or deliberate CW release, the outcome of the UN-sponsored conference on Middle 
East disarmament called for by the 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (if held at all), and the US presidential elections. 
 
Ms Clara Ganslandt and Mr Nikos Panayiotou (Presidency, Permanent Representation of Cyprus to 
the OPCW) offered some workshop conclusions and reflected on the preparations for an EU 
Common Position for the Third Review Conference. Dr Jean Pascal Zanders thanked the speakers 
and the participants for their input into the day’s proceedings. 
 
III. Discussion 
On future priorities for the OPCW 
Future OPCW priorities must inevitably be considered in the context of the debates on the budget. 
While the OPCW is expected to adapt to new challenges (including terrorist threats), pressures to 
reduce the budget continue. The disappearance of knowledgeable experts or people with specific 
expertise poses a real risk. 
 
Budgetary considerations also have significant implications for support programmes, notably 
regarding national implementation assistance for States Parties. Several participants advocated 
integration of national legislation covering chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons. 
However, this is beyond the scope of the assistance the OPCW can provide. Existing programmes 
need to be critically evaluated for their effectiveness and the option of more bilateral assistance 
should be considered. Several people wondered whether an opportunity for greater EU leadership 
exists here. 
 
The organisation of emergency assistance under Article X was raised in the context of the Syrian 
crisis. Several participants remarked on the EU’s silence on the threat posed by Syrian CW to the 
Syrian population and neighbouring countries. The EU could announce that in case of a serious 
incident, it would materially support OPCW responses to the crises or organise bilateral emergency 
assistance to States Parties in the region. Both options are allowed under Article X.  
 
On the role of National Authorities 
To most participants a discussion on the recalibration of responsibilities between the Technical 
Secretariat and National Authorities was either irrelevant or premature. They attached far greater 
importance to the optimisation of the tools already provided for in the CWC. Presently, National 
Authorities need to be strengthened to perform their current tasks; in many countries they are a 
mere letterbox for the OPCW. Besides their role in national data collection and assistance to the 
OPCW with regard to verification, the effectiveness of a National Authority could also be judged in 
function of their outreach to national stakeholders (industry, scientific community, etc.) and the 
nomination of nationals to participate in various OPCW events, including training courses. 
 
On science and technology 
Conversion between chemistry and biology was a major topic. It was stressed that this discussion is 
not about the merging of the CWC and the BTWC, but concerned a number of advances that draw 
on new products and processes based on insights from the two scientific fields and their practical 
applications. These pose challenges for the reporting requirements and verification parameters 




On civil society involvement 
The participation of civil society in the CWC was a recurring theme. Civil society representatives 
find it difficult to have access to pertinent information and documents. Their participation in major 
events, such as Conferences of States Parties and Review Conferences, is not guaranteed. Side 
events are difficult to organise (particularly if compared to the possibilities during meetings of the 
BTWC), and some events are organised in buildings far removed from the conference centre or 
OPCW headquarters. Contrary to the past, access to the OPCW library and canteen is no longer 
possible when meeting with staff of the Technical Secretariat. 
 
It was argued that the most relevant contributions from civil society to the CWC process occur 
through their publications and organisation of events with delegates. Nevertheless, it was 
recognised that this was not an ideal situation and the Director General of the OPCW seeks to 
ameliorate it. 
 
The composition of ‘civil society’, the politicisation of its agenda and the place of the scientist in it 
engendered some exchanges. Scientific advice has the aura of neutrality, but ‘the’ scientist may also 
pursue a political agenda. The possibility of achieving consensus on a particular issue or on the 
relative importance of a particular issue among the various civil society constituencies is close to 
zero. Too many types of civil society organisations exist and they all represent different agendas. Of 
greater concern, however, is how the scientific community could be engaged in more systematic 
ways. Often their professional requirements (e.g., publication pressure in high-impact, peer 
reviewed journals, but with limited reach) are at odds with active participation in the CWC process. 
Ways need to be found to credit their input. Another question concerned the regional diversification 
of civil society participation, as many States Parties view civil society as a Western tool to influence 
their own policies. Notwithstanding, many representatives from EU Member States underscored the 
many positive contributions to the CWC from civil society constituencies. 
 
On EU support for the CWC 
Nobody questioned the substantial contributions the EU makes to the OPCW. However, some 
representatives from EU Members wondered how the EU might increase its impact on the 
organisation. In particular, many would welcome the presence of an EEAS representative at internal 
coordination meetings in The Hague. 
